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The "Bad Samaritan" Paradigm,
by Anthony D'Amato, 70 Northwestern University Law Review 798-812 (1976)
Abstract: This essay will attempt to show that the disparity between the rule of law and the dictates of morality is
itself a product of the paradigmatic way in which the "Bad Samaritan" cases are analyzed. If we examine the cases
in an entirely different way, many of the standard problems will dissolve and new alternatives will become apparent.
The essay will also show that the "Bad Samaritan" paradigm is part of a larger paradigm linking the law of torts
with the criminal law, which also needs to be reexamined. Finally a recommendation for dealing with the "Bad
Samaritan" problem legislatively is offered.

Tags: Tort Liability, Criminal Liability, Bad Samaritan, Good Samaritan, Duty To Warn or Rescue, Genovese
Killing

[pg798]** Sometimes the structure of a legal argument seems so natural and compelling that
its conclusion survives for decades or even centuries. [FN1] The conclusion persists because its
challengers fail to reject the logical structure of the argument. Rather, they employ the same
structure in trying to refute the argument. The structure seems so natural that they cannot get
"outside" of it and thus fail in their attempt to offer a convincing alternative solution. An
example of this type of paradigm is the "Bad Samaritan" line of cases in American law,
establishing a rule that there is no duty to warn or rescue. This particular chapter of our law is
unsettling as well as unsettled because of the disparity between the rule of law and the dictates of
morality. This essay will attempt to show that this disparity is itself a product of the paradigmatic
way in which the "Bad Samaritan" cases are analyzed. If we examine the cases in an entirely
different way, many of the standard problems will dissolve and new alternatives will become
apparent. The essay will also show that the "Bad Samaritan" paradigm is part of a larger
paradigm linking the law of torts with the criminal law, which also needs to be reexamined.
Finally a recommendation for dealing with the "Bad Samaritan" problem legislatively will be
offered, although the essay's purpose is less to recommend a specific solution than to indicate a
means of reconceptualization.
THE STANDARD ANALYSIS
Articles and judicial opinions tend to begin their analysis from the viewpoint of the victim in
a series of egregious cases where [pg799] strangers failed to utter a word of warning or lift a
finger to help. Examples are numerous. Someone drowns while a man sitting on a dock simply
witnesses the event without throwing down a rope that is at hand. [FN2] A man does nothing as
his neighbor's child hammers on a dangerous explosive. [FN3] No warning is given to one who
is walking into the jaws of a dangerous machine. [FN4] A boy, trespassing on a railroad, has a
leg and arm cut off by the car wheels; the employees of the railroad fail to call a doctor or render
any assistance and the boy bleeds to death. [FN5] In the most conspicuous recent example, a
woman, Kitty Genovese, was attacked and beaten to death on a city street while 38 witnesses
watched the killing from the safety of their apartments and failed to call the police. [FN6] In
these and similar cases the courts have held that there is no tort liability for those who failed to
warn, rescue, or call for assistance.
Without exception, commentators on these cases respond with moral if not legal
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condemnation, finding these judicial results "morally barbaric" [FN7] and "revolting to any
moral sense." [FN8] In a typical comment, one court said of a nonrescuer: "[H]e may, perhaps,
justly be styled a ruthless savage and a moral monster; but he is not liable in damages...." [FN9]
Searching for an analytical justification for the outcome of these cases, writers have suggested
that the distinction between these and more typical tort cases is that these cases involve
nonfeasance. [FN10] However, the apparent distinction between action [pg800] and inaction is
no longer valid in such other areas of tort law as the manufacture of defective automobiles, or
driving an automobile without prior inspection. [FN11] Another suggestion has been that the
cases are anomalous in tort law, and that the courts are likely to close the gap between law and
morality by finding a "special relationship" between the parties which justifies holding the
defendant responsible to warn or rescue the plaintiff. [FN12] Specially related defendants now
include, among others, carriers, innkeepers, employers, shopkeepers, jailers, schools, hospitals,
and parents. [FN13] This characterization, however, has not been extended to include all
licensors, [FN14] and an objective reading of the cases lends little support to the view that the
courts are trying to close the gap, but rather affirms the theory of commentators McNiece and
Thornton that the courts impose liability for nonfeasance only where a beneficial relationship
exists on the part of the obligor towards the obligee. [FN15] Other writers express the hope that
legislatures will correct the common law in the "Bad Samaritan" area by making it a statutory
tort or crime to fail to warn or rescue. [FN16] Vermont has recently enacted such a statute.
[FN17] A related class of statutes, increasingly common, makes it a crime to leave the scene of
an automobile accident. [FN18]
[pg801]The paradigm thus consists of moral outrage at the "Bad Samaritan" from the victim's
viewpoint, relatively unsuccessful attempts to explain the cases logically, and a call for judicial
and legislative relief. Rarely is consideration given to the Samaritan's situation. Some limited
attention has been given the defendant in statutes lowering due-care standards in order to
encourage physicians to provide emergency treatment to injured persons. [FN19] One valuable
study has examined European cases in which the Samaritan-rescuer is hurt and sues the victim.
[FN20] These situations occur frequently in non-common-law countries where it is illegal for a
person to fail to warn or rescue. [FN21] But generally, little attention is paid to the question of
whether or not it would be fair to coerce a person into being a "good" rather than "bad"
Samaritan, or whether such coercion, if desirable, should be exercised through the civil or
criminal law. This indifference to the Samaritan's situation is reflected in Professor Franklin's
casual statement that Vermont courts could appropriately "supplement" the statutory, criminally
sanctioned duty to rescue with "extensive civil liability." [FN22] Professor Franklin's statement
is certainly not atypical, and is singled out for mention only because the idea is treated so
off-handedly in a generally incisive article. The easy equation of civil and criminal liability
seems to be an integral feature of the paradigm.
WHAT BASIS FOR TORT LIABILITY?
A starting point for the discussion of whether or not there should be tort liability is the
following situation: a stranger S fails to [pg802] warn a victim V of impending peril, or to call
for help, or to rescue him even though the rescue entails minimal risk. It is submitted that the
courts are justified in holding that there should be no tort liability imposed upon S. However, in
the next section it will be argued that criminal liability should be imposed upon S by statute.
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In a civil action, V would basically be claiming an entitlement against S to be rescued by S.
[FN23] If the law were to recognize such an action, S would either have to rescue V or be liable
in damages. But, suppose V is a thrill seeker who wants to risk his life in such a way that
someone else will be forced either to rescue him or to pay his hospital bills. For example, V
decides to dive from a bridge into a river, even though he cannot swim, because S happens to be
sitting on the bank of the river. Should the fact that S is sitting there, watching V dive into the
river and then struggle to stay afloat, mean that S, a good swimmer, suddenly becomes liable to
V's widow for damages unless he jumps in and rescues V? Would the situation be different if S,
seeing V about to dive from the bridge, yells to him "Don't jump," or "If you jump, I won't
rescue you"? What if S says, "I'm going to look the other way and put cotton in my ears"?
More generally, what can S do to avoid having the claimed entitlement arise? Since the
entitlement V claims rests upon S's inaction (in this case S's failure to rescue), to escape liability
S would have to act. If he runs away from the scene while V is still on the bridge, has S removed
himself from the "Samaritan" relation? Surely V would argue that S unreasonably was evading
his responsibilities. But if one concludes that V's action in jumping off the bridge automatically
gives him an entitlement against S, we make S an insurer of every reckless act that he happens to
see or that has been staged for his particular detriment.
[pg803] If the preceding hypothetical situation seems too unrealistic, consider a case where
V does not deliberately risk injury. S and V are inspecting archeological ruins, and V approaches
the edge of a precipice to get a better view. "Watch out," warns S, "there's loose footing and you
might fall." V replies, "You're just too cautious," takes another step, and promptly falls. On these
facts, should S be obligated either to rescue V or be subject to liability in damages?
Another question is whether S would be able to insure himself against the damages V might
claim if the law were to give V an entitlement to be rescued. Such insurance would be more
expensive for S1 who is young, healthy, and a lover of the outdoors, than for S2 , who is hard of
hearing, poor of eyesight, and inclined to stay indoors. This may well penalize an individual's
freedoms of travel and association. [FN24]
It is possible that S would not even be able to get insurance for an act that could be an
intentional violation of the law. [FN25] Assuming the law gives V an entitlement to be rescued,
if S fails to rescue V, S has intentionally failed to do something required by the law, and an
insurance company might not be willing to sell S an insurance policy to cover such situations.
This, then, is a further reason for discrediting V's claimed entitlement. It is more likely that V
would be able to get accident insurance than it is that S would be able to procure failure-to-warn
or failure-to-rescue insurance.
Of course, V will argue that he would not have taken the risk that led to his imperilment but
for the fact that S was nearby. In [pg804] other words he will assert that he relied to some extent
on S's potential assistance, and that this reliance is the basis for his entitlement to be rescued. S
can respond that under existing law he is under no legal obligation to rescue V, and a court
should not fashion a legal obligation out of V's mistake of law. But this argument might prove
unpersuasive to a court, which might hold that the obviously strong moral obligation upon S
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could reasonably have been relied upon by V. Furthermore, a judge might find that these facts
are precisely what he has been waiting for in order to change the old immoral common law
anyway! Thus a better argument for S is a combination of the ones previously given: S's right to
freedom coupled with the need to deter intentionally foolish or highly negligent and risky actions
by persons in the vicinity of S. The courts should not impair S's freedom to travel by making him
a walking insurer for foolhardy or thrill-seeking persons. Yet S's presence in the vicinity of V
should make a difference to a legislature contemplating a statute making it a crime for S to fail to
warn or to rescue.
A CRIMINAL SANCTION
Theoretical Considerations
I now want to argue that it is not inconsistent both to reject civil liability and to advocate the
passage of a statute making the failure to warn or rescue a criminal offense. One such statute is
Vermont's "Duty to Aid the Endangered Act" which places a maximum fine of $100 for willful
violation of the following section: [FN26]
A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the extent
that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or without interference with
important duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that
assistance or care is being provided by others.
Despite any implications to the contrary in the discussion to this point, I believe that it is
immoral for S to refuse to assist V when there is no danger to S. But in examining my own
reasons to support this ethical conclusion, I find the problem to be rather perplexing. This belief
may result from the paradigm criticized earlier which starts by taking V's viewpoint and ignoring
S's. However, S might argue that in an overpopulated world there should be a natural [pg805]
selecting out of foolhardy risk-takers like V. V's reply is that S should rescue V because he
should do unto others what he would have others do unto him. [FN27] But in the archeological
ruins example, where S would not stand near the precipice and warned V not to do so, it would
be false to argue that their situations could be reversed. [FN28] Moreover, one must consider the
possible impact upon morality of enacting a rescue law such as Vermont's. As matters stand now,
if S rescues V he does so purely out of moral considerations, and is deserving of praise for his
altruistic actions. [FN29] Once a law is passed, S will not be acting out of altruism but out of his
own self-interest in avoiding the criminal sanction of the law. Thus, the law has arguably
destroyed the basis for altruistic behavior by requiring it. [FN30] However, the fact that a
majority of the members of a state might find it in their self-interest to pass such legislation does
not necessarily deprive any smaller class of people of the possibility of moral behavior. If the
behavior is morally required, then it should not be significant that it be labelled "altruistic."
In any case, argument for a Vermont-type statute need not rest upon moral considerations but
rather may be based on pure Hobbesian expediency. [FN31] Suppose V is drowning and above
him on the dock is a coil of rope which S could easily push into the water. It was argued earlier
that S should have no duty personally to V to push over the rope. Even if he had such a duty, S
might be judgment-proof, and thus the potential tort liability would not induce him to save the
[pg806] drowning man. Yet, should not V have some "claim" over S sufficient to require S to
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throw down the rope? Suppose there are 15 S's sitting on the dock and none of them moves;
should not V have some means of coercing them to act? V can argue: "I took a risk in these
waters even though I cannot swim (or even though I knew I might get a sudden cramp) because I
resolved to stay close to the dock, because I knew there was a coil of rope on the dock, and
because there were some people around. I did not take the risk because I wanted them to insure
me against injuries, since I have no civil entitlement against any of them. But there should be
some law forcing them to throw me the rope to save my life at no risk to them." [FN32]
The next step in the argument is to note that V might be any citizen. Everyone is aware of the
existence of other people around him and, at least subconsciously, relies upon that fact. Kitty
Genovese walking a city street at night probably relied to some extent upon the fact that the
street was lit and there were many neighbors around, some of whom would be at or near their
windows and would hear and be responsive to any call for help. If she had been in the middle of
a park surrounded only by trees, she would have been assuming a much greater risk. That risk
may have deterred her from walking in a park late at night. But on a city street, even in the
evening, she had a right to assume that part of her "environment" was a number of neighbors
who could easily call for assistance. V expects strangers in the vicinity to warn or assist him not
because they owe him a personal duty, but because they are members of society and ought to act
responsibly. To be sure, a legal system might "teach" people that such reliance is unjustified, but
here we are considering probable social attitudes in a prelaw hypothetical context. Thus the "Bad
Samaritan" in the extreme cases cited at the beginning of this essay was acting antisocially in
failing to do what society [pg807] felt he was ethically obligated to do, even though he was not
violating a personal duty owed to the stranger-victim.
Since antisocial behavior constitutes a "public wrong," [FN33] it can appropriately be made
the subject of a criminal statute. American law has too easily and automatically equated criminal
wrongs with civil harms, "violation of statute" as a standard for negligence being one example.
[FN34] Yet there is an important difference even in respect to strictly personal crimes. A
murderer harms society as well as his victim. The distinction is recognized by the fact that the
victim's consent does not justify the homicide from the criminal law standpoint. Furthermore, the
decision whether to go ahead with the prosecution for any crime is the state's. [FN35] The victim
cannot compel the state to drop the prosecution, since the state is vindicating a public wrong in
addition to the victim's private injury, which the victim may or may not choose to proceed with
in a civil action for damages. Therefore, if a state wishes to enact a Vermont-type statute, it can
do so for reasons that are similar to those underlying any other criminal legislation—to protect a
distinctly societal interest. [FN36]
Although V can reasonably expect to be safer in the presence of others than if alone in a park
or dark alley, the argument for a Vermont-type statute certainly cannot rest upon this
expectation, since the argument ultimately begs the question. Indeed, one might suggest that it is
foolish of V to have any such expectation; perhaps the Kitty Genovese killing "taught" the public
that it is unreasonable to expect a measure of safety on a public street. To justify the
Vermont-type statute, therefore, one should look at a more universal self- interested basis for
criminal legislation. This comes from the ability of each citizen to see himself in the role of V.
Even the "Bad Samaritan" can imagine being an accident victim someday, in which case he
would want anyone in the vicinity to be forced by law to be a "Good Samaritan." [FN37] This
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potential role reversal does not have the [pg808] same application in the tort-law situation
discussed previously. First, if S is rich and V judgment-proof, S might be induced to save V, but
when the roles are reversed V might have no similar incentive to save S. Second, tort liability is
subject to abuse: V might deliberately engage in risky conduct in S's presence because he wants
S to be his insurer or wants to have a final reckless fling knowing that if he dies his survivors can
recover a considerable amount in damages by suing S for wrongful death. Third, and more
generally, imposing tort liability gives a monetary reward to risk takers and penalizes risk
avoiders; such personality traits are not role reversible, and hence the argument that S might be
in V's position someday is not persuasive.
On the criminal side, the positions are reciprocal precisely because the element of monetary
compensation for the accident is removed. V may be more accident prone than S because V may
be a risk taker and S a risk avoider, but there is no tort law that compensates V at S's expense.
Rather, V is penalized for his risk taking (and hence deterred) by the injuries he receives. S is
penalized only by the criminal law if he fails to assist V when he easily could have done so. This
sort of penalty is fair to S because he may someday be in V's position although that possibility
may be small compared to V's own likelihood. [FN38]
A criminal statute makes sense, therefore, because it deters antisocial conduct on the part of
the "Bad Samaritan." Civil liability, however, cannot be justified because there is no moral
reason why S should have to compensate V for actions which S did not cause and which S even
may have tried to prevent. S's failure to help should be punished by the criminal law, and that
sanction should be appropriately related to what S did or failed to do. [FN39] The sanction
should not [pg809] be tied to V's injury for which S's omission was causally unrelated [FN40]
and for which V alone should be responsible. Moreover, it would be ill-considered to argue for
tort liability as an additional deterrent factor; the criminal penalty can be set by society at any
level necessary to strike the correct balance between the need for deterrence and other values
such as S's freedom of mobility. Furthermore, tort liability would operate as an uneven penalty in
addition to the statutorily determined criminal penalty; it is ineffective against the poor or the
judgment-proof. [FN41]
Practical Considerations
Legal and moral rules are in symbiotic relation; one "learns" what is moral by observing
what other people (initially, parents) tend to enforce. [FN42] Professor Franklin has cited
statistically significant surveys indicating that more of the public will regard the duty to rescue
as morally required in jurisdictions where it is also legally required. [FN43] Even the Vermont
statute prescribing only a $100 fine for failure to give assistance should heighten the public's
moral sense. Thus we may assume that a Vermont-type statute will be a factor in helping people
in distress even when the Samaritan is the only other person on the scene and the appeal must be
to his sense of ethics.
A criminal statute will also work in more traditional ways. S will certainly be motivated to
help if a policeman is in the vicinity, and he will also give assistance to the victim if there are
nonofficial witnesses around who could later testify in a criminal proceeding against S. Even
where S and V are alone, if S refuses to give [pg810] assistance and V escapes with his life, V
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can later report S's violation to the authorities. The criminal statute, unlike tort liability, has the
effect of making S's behavior a matter of public interest.
In addition, prosecutorial discretion provides an important safeguard for potential
Samaritans. For example, assume a jurisdiction has a Vermont-type statute as well as a civil
action for tort based upon the statutory standard. V gets a cramp in turbulent waters and calls for
help. S, a wealthy person but a poor swimmer, decides he probably would not be able to rescue
V himself, so instead he runs to get help. But when the people he summons arrive, S has
drowned. On these facts, it is extremely unlikely that a prosecutor would indict S for violation of
the statute. But V's heirs might not be similarly deterred from bringing a civil action for
wrongful death since there is a possibility that a jury might disbelieve S's assessment of his own
swimming ability. Furthermore, the possibility of such jury action, coupled with the notoriety
that the case might engender, might induce S to settle with V's heirs for a significant amount to
avoid the litigation and publicity. Or consider the example of V deliberately taking a risk
because a rich S is nearby. Here, too, the state would probably decide not to prosecute but V's
heirs might not have similar reservations. Prosecutorial discretion is, of course, a general
safeguard for defendants in criminal cases. In the Samaritan situation, because the defendant's
difficult-to-assess judgment whether or not to act is the essence of the crime, the prosecutor's
discretion appears to be vitally important.
A PROPOSAL
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the adoption of a Vermont-type statute coupled
with a statutory provision explicitly prohibiting any private action based upon violation of the
statutory standard is the proper solution to the "Bad Samaritan" problem. The Vermont statute
does not contain such a prohibition. Upon reflection, however, a legislator should determine that
the same moral considerations which prompt him to require S to give assistance to V also should
bar V from obtaining compensation or restitution from S. The criminal sanction is fair provided
that there is no additional civil liability. It is possible that the tendency to assume that torts can
be fashioned out of crimes accounts for the reluctance of other states to pass a Vermont-type
statute. Legislators may feel that, while the common law presently works a hardship [pg811]
upon V, a crime-plus-tort package would work a hardship upon S. If this is so, then an explicit
statutory prohibition of the tort action would be an important part of the legislation.
Another important part of the statutory solution, only alluded to here since it has been
discussed at length elsewhere, [FN44] is the need to provide S with compensation from V if S is
injured in the act of helping V. Without this potential for compensation, S's decision to act would
be affected by his calculation of the comparative costs of violating or complying with the statute.
Despite Professor Posner's analysis, [FN45] it is unwise to view the criminal law in cost-benefit
terms. Rather, it should be a set of rules with which one ought to comply, apart from economic
calculations, precisely because legal rules should be congruent with rules of morality. S's first
thought ought to be compliance with the statute, but he should not be penalized for complying by
an injury sustained in the process of rescuing V. If he were so penalized, S would undoubtedly
be inclined to assess the criminal law in economic terms. Thus, the statute I propose would
provide that S is entitled to compensation from V for any time, trouble, or injury incurred in
rescuing V. [FN46] This should be so even if S is a doctor who renders unsolicited emergency
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aid to V. [FN47]
[pg812] One possible objection to the proposal presented here is that it requires adding to an
already overlong list of crimes in our society. I am indeed reluctant in principle to propose a new
crime, but a more important consideration is that of reducing the gap between criminal and moral
rules. In the Samaritan case, this dictates adding to the criminal rules; in the victimless crime
context, on the other hand, this consideration requires decriminalizing conduct no longer
regarded as immoral. [FN48]
CONCLUSION
This essay has offered an alternative paradigm to that which is typically employed in the
"Bad Samaritan" cases. Instead of beginning with the victim's viewpoint and regarding the law as
a fitful attempt to catch up with twentieth century morality, it has attempted to show that from
the potential Samaritan's perspective there are compelling reasons why he should not be required
to compensate the victim. Moreover, it is suggested that there is a critical difference between the
impact of criminal law and tort law upon this problem, and, surprisingly, the former may be far
more desirable. Such a conclusion is inconsistent with the usual American approach of finding
equivalences between public and private harms, but this may be the exceptional case which
illuminates that important distinction. Legislatures cannot be expected to adopt quickly the
proposal suggested here, largely because their thinking is the same as that of legal writers and
judges. As Professor Kuhn has noted, new paradigms do not replace old ones in the history of
science because they are more logical; rather, the old ones persist until those holding them die of
old age. Hopefully, the progress of the law is not quite so slow, because the stakes are high.
There is a need for help from a stranger when an accident occurs, and the law should attempt to
meet that need without going so far as to make everyone his brother's insurer.
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[hereinafter cited as Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio]. See also Rudzinski, The Duty to Rescue: A
Comparative Analysis, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN, supra note 8, at 91 [hereinafter cited as
Rudzinski].
[FN21] Rudzinski counts 15 European countries with criminal code provisions stipulating a duty
to rescue. Rudzinski, supra note 20, at 92. See also Hofstetter & Marschall, Amendment of the
Belgian Code Pénal: The Duty to Rescue Persons in Serious Danger, 11 AM.J.COMP.L. 66
(1962).
[FN22] Franklin, supra note 16, at 56. However, Professor Epstein has recently attempted to
support the common-law result in the Samaritan cases in a thought-provoking article. See
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.LEG.STUD. 151, 189-204 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Epstein].
[FN23] See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV.L.REV. 1089 (1972). See also Epstein, supra note 22. Despite his
admission that the common-law Samaritan rule "does not appeal to our highest sense of
benevolence and charity," id. at 197, Professor Epstein tries to justify or rationalize the rule by
taking a position that seems to lie uneasily between morals and economics. He insists that the
defendant physically must have caused the plaintiff's injury (even if nonnegligently), but this in
itself is hardly a conclusive moral test and, as criticized by Posner, hardly a rational economic
test either. See Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J.LEG.STUD. 205, 217-19 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Posner, Strict Liability]. Neither Epstein nor Posner suggest a criminal-law
remedy, Epstein because he has rationalized the common-law tort approach and Posner because
he seems to view criminal law as limited by economic considerations. See text accompanying
note 45 infra.
[FN24] Such freedoms in the Samaritan context are sometimes treated as nineteenth century
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anachronisms. In a famous early article, Dean Ames saw a wide ambit for individual freedom as
characteristic of legal systems which have not reached maturity. See Ames, supra note 8. Cf.
McNiece, supra note 11, at 1288. Dean Prosser, citing Leon Green, writes that "the highly
individualistic philosophy of the older common law ... shrank from converting the courts into an
agency for forcing men to help one another." PROSSER, supra note 8, at 339, citing L. GREEN,
JUDGE AND JURY 62 (1930).
But a more insightful approach would appear to be that advocated by Professor Nozick—
namely, to view the state as a minimal mutual protective association. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE AND UTOPIA 26-119 (1974). If the majority of citizens feel the need for forcing others to
rescue them, let them secure a legislative majority and pass a statute. But to achieve such a result
judicially might be to impose a distinctly minority solution that would undamentally endanger
individual freedom.
Note, however, that legislative and judicial solutions are not and, as we shall see, should not
be interchangeable. Most obviously, the statutory solution would probably be a criminal statute,
a remedy which the courts cannot create judicially.
[FN25] See Franklin, supra note 16, at 56 n. 35.
[FN26] VT.STAT.ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973).
[FN27] See R. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 86-111 (1963).
[FN28] In the Biblical case, Luke 10:29-37, the "Good Samaritan" not only bound up the
stranger's wounds, but took him to an inn, fed him, and left the inkeeper a sum of money. Perfect
altruism would seem to require one to give all he possesses to the poor and spend his life
assisting others without pay.
[FN29] See D. HUME, ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS § 2 (1777).
[FN30] This argument seems persuasive until one realizes that universal altruism is
self-contradictory. Suppose four perfectly altruistic persons are stranded on a desert island: A
gives his hut to B, who simultaneously has given his hut to C, who gives his to D; and D gives
his to A. Each person is now living in a hut, the only difference being that the hut, moments
before, belonged to another. These transactions or swaps can occur constantly, but the resulting
"altruism" is indistinguishable from self-interest.
This situation is even more circular if each person declares that he will only be altruistic
toward those who deserve it. Thus, B will give his hut to C only if C gives his hut to someone
else. Not only does this "lock in" the altruism, but curiously it sets up the expectation of reward
for one's altruism, which is self-contradictory.
[FN31] T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN chs. 13, 21 (1651) (to the effect that security is the only, and
ultimate, value).
[FN32] This sort of argument, incidentally, parallels the self-interested contractual reasoning of
those in Rawls' construct of an "original position" which he offers as the moral basis of a just
society. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-22 (1971). See also E. CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION
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190-97 (1955). Posner recognizes a related situation as having high transaction costs. See
Posner, Strict Liability, supra note 23, at 219. But his economic analysis seems inappropriate: in
"warning" cases, any transaction would be absurd since the negotiations would give away the
warning, whereas in "rescue" cases, while negotiations are feasible, the "bargain" ultimately
struck would probably be absurd (what is the coiled rope worth to the drowning person? A
million dollars? Five million? What if he is poor? Or if he reneges once he is saved?) The
noneconomic criminal-law approach seems preferable to Professor Posner's economic solution.
[FN33] Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV.L.REV. 317 (1914) [hereinafter
cited as Thayer].
[FN34] See Thayer, supra note 33; Note, The Use of Criminal Statutes in the Creation of New
Torts, 48 COLUM.L.REV. 456 (1948).
[FN35] P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 8 (1965).
[FN36] Not all crimes, of course, have definable individual victims; consider counterfeiting,
espionage, flag desecration, etc.
[FN37] Rousseau in his Social Contract pointed out that even a thief wants the laws of private
property enforced; the very point of his act is to transfer property to his own exclusive enjoyment
which he then expects the police to safeguard like any other property. J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT I, vii-ix (1762).
[FN38] Incidentally, if criminal-law penalties could be made an exact science, the amount of the
penalty in a Vermont-type statute should be computed, in part, (the most important factor being
an assessment of what it will take to deter "Bad Samaritan" behavior) on the probability of S
being an accident victim and not on V's (that is, the risk taker's) probabilities, for the more V's
situation is taken into account the more the criminal law would tend to operate as compensation
to V and as a redistribution of values from risk avoiders to risk takers.
[FN39] As Professor Franklin points out, there could be criminal liability for failure to act even
though later events show that the rescue in fact would not have succeeded. Franklin, supra note
16, at 55. Although he did not pursue this thought, it might be added that his observation further
distinguishes tort from criminal liability in as much as prosecution might attach even if V's death
appeared certain and imminent, as French and Polish decisions have affirmed. See Rudzinski,
supra note 20, at 101 nn. 28, 29. It is hard to imagine that a jury would reach the same result in a
civil action for damages.
[FN40] This is, of course, excluding for the present discussion any "special relationship"
between S and V. The text here does not fully accept Professor Epstein's insistence upon
physical causation. See Epstein, supra note 22. Causation or lack thereof is not conclusive of the
moral issue. But it does serve to differentiate the tort approach from the criminal remedy in an
argument that recognizes the latter as normatively essential.
[FN41] Apparently, so far only the German courts have reached the result that there is no tort
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liability in addition to the criminal-code duty to rescue. See Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio, supra
note 20, at 1107 n. 80. The French courts, in contrast, add the tort liability to the criminal
sanction. Id. at 1107-08.
[FN42] See J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1952).
[FN43] Franklin, supra note 16, at 58-60, citing inter alia ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR:
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOME ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES (J. Macaulay &
L. Berkowitz, eds. 1970). See also Gusfield, Social Sources of Levites and Samaritans, in THE
GOOD SAMARITAN, supra note 8: "The very passage of a law is an act of public definition of
what is moral or immoral." Id. at 196.
[FN44] See Dawson, Rewards, supra note 19; Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio, supra note 20.
[FN45] R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 357-60 (1972).
[FN46] European sources consulted by Professor Dawson indicate no disposition for
compensating the rescuer for his time spent and risk incurred when the risk did not result in loss.
See Dawson, Rewards, supra note 19, at 84. But clearly it is in the public's self-interest to have
some such compensation mechanism. The Kitty Genovese killing (see note 6 supra) raises the
basic issue. A witness might well ponder the fact that if he calls the police he will set in motion a
personal involvement that would include police questioning, pretrial depositions, line-up
inspection, appearing as a witness at the trial of the assailant, perhaps death threats if the
defendant has "mob" connections, newspaper publicity and loss of privacy. In light of these
noncompensable costs, is it any wonder that each of the 38 witnesses concluded, "Let someone
else notify the police"?
[FN47] A number of "Good Samaritan" statutes lower the standard of due care for rescuers so
that they will be encouraged to perform the rescue operation in the first place. See COLUMBIA
NOTE, supra note 8, at 1308-12; Dyke, supra note 8, at 680-83. These statutes attack a symptom
of the Samaritan problem while ignoring its cause. If we were to have a criminal statute
requiring rescue, one sees no reason why a reasonable man standard cannot be applied to the
rescue attempt. Why should the law encourage bumbling or negligent rescues once the duty has
devolved upon everyone to render assistance to an imperiled victim?
One problem that may arise if Vermont-type statutes become widespread is the "phony"
accident designed to lure a driver into stopping his car. Scheid, supra note 8, at 1 n. 2, discusses
a news story concerning a driver stopping to aid what seemed to be a stalled motorist, and
getting robbed of his car for his pains. However, it is not clear that Vermont-type statutes will
add to the phony accident set-up which already is fairly common absent those statutes. Indeed,
such statutes might result in every driver along the road stopping to investigate the "accident,"
with the result that the would-be robbers would be deterred! Conceivably the "phony accident"
ploy works better when only one out of every 50 or 100 drivers who are uncommonly altruistic
will stop their cars; a law "forcing" everyone to be "altruistic" could help deter the phony
accident scheme.
[FN48] Once the public begins to regard certain acts as no longer immoral (e.g., acts of sexual

13

"perversion" that still are proscribed criminally in most jurisdictions) decriminalizing them will
accelerate the public's view that they are not immoral acts; the symbiotic relation between law
and morals works in this direction as well.
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